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Abstract
Finite-length codes are learned for the Gaussian wiretap channel in an end-to-end manner assuming
that the communication parties are equipped with deep neural networks (DNNs), and communicate
through binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation scheme. The goal is to find codes via DNNs
which allow a pair of transmitter and receiver to communicate reliably and securely in the presence of an
adversary aiming at decoding the secret messages. Following the information-theoretic secrecy principles,
the security is evaluated in terms of mutual information utilizing a deep learning tool called MINE
(mutual information neural estimation). System performance is evaluated for different DNN architectures,
designed based on the existing secure coding schemes, at the transmitter. Numerical results demonstrate
that the legitimate parties can indeed establish a secure transmission in this setting as the learned codes
achieve points on almost the boundary of the equivocation region.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer (PHY) security has been put forth as an alternative/aid to the higher-layer
security approaches including cryptography in order to relieve the burden placed by them upon
the communication systems in various ways. Wiretap channel [1] is a widely-known theoretical
model for studying PHY security from an information-theoretic perspective. The importance
of achieving physical layer security for this model through finite alphabet signaling like binary
phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation is highlighted in many works [1], [2]. Several works have
studied this channel and designed coding schemes to ensure security for that. Specifically, the
authors in [3] have proposed an encoding technique called scrambling which could result in
BERs very close to 0.5 for the eavesdropper (Eve) through error propagation, while ensuring a
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2reliable communication for Alice and Bob known as the legitimate parties. The coset-coding
approach has been studied for the Gaussian wiretap channel under the name of the randomized
scheme in several works [1], [4]. The authors in [4], [5] utilize convolutional and turbo codes for
the randomized scheme and propose bounds on the performance of the optimal decoders in this
setup. Furthermore, the application of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes to the randomized
scheme is studied in [6]. The metric used to evaluate the coding performance in these works is
security gap which reflects the required difference between the qualities of the Bob’s and Eve’s
channels in order to comply with the security and reliability criteria both measured in BER. The
major shortcoming of this metric is that it assumes a BER of 0.5 at Eve is an indication of a
secured system, however, it does not provide any insight to the information-theoretic nature of
the wiretap channel. In an effort to make such a connection, the authors in [7] obtain a lower
bound on the equivocation rate, i.e., the conditional entropy of the secret messages given the
Eve’s observation, and obtain achievable points on the equivocation region for several LDPC
codes.
Application of deep learning for the Gaussian wiretap channel is studied in [8] where the
authors resort to an alternative metric for measuring security claiming that the computation of
mutual information is not tractable. The most similar work to the one presented in this paper is [9]
where the authors utilize autoencoders for designing wiretap codes by leveraging a loss function
which captures both reliability and security constraint. However, they rely on approximations to
compute the mutual information and limit their analysis to the low SNR regimes. Furthermore,
their approach does not address the problem of finite alphabet signaling for the wiretap channel.
In this work, we propose learning practical codes for the wiretap channel in an end-to-end
manner through stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithms using mutual information as the
secrecy metric. In this way, we are able to find the true characterization of the system from an
information-theoretic perspective. To this end, the encoder at Alice and the decoders at Bob
and Eve are represented by deep neural networks (DNNs) which are trained in order to achieve
reliable and secure communication for the Alice-Bob link while Eve is trained to decode the
secret messages. These goals are further translated to appropriate loss functions which are to
be minimized over the DNNs’ parameters via SGD algorithms. In order to comply with the
BPSK-constrained wiretap channel, we force the DNN at the encoder to produce binary values,
and send +1 an −1 through the channel. The loss function for Alice-Bob includes the BER at
Bob and the mutual information between the Eve’s observation and the secret messages, which
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3correspond to reliability and security constraints, respectively. Regrading the security loss, we use
a recently-proposed deep learning algorithm called mutual information neural estimation (MINE)
[10] to directly compute the mutual information for our setup. Moreover, as Eve’s goal is to
decode the secret messages as well, its loss function is chosen to be the corresponding BER at
Eve. We investigate the system performance for different DNN architectures at Alice, which are
inspired by the existing secure coding schemes. Numerical results illustrate that a DNN which
incorporates random bits for encoding the data bits substantially outperforms the other encoders,
and the corresponding learned codes achieve points as close as 0.003 from the boundary of the
equivocation region. We also compare our result with the autoencoder approach presented in [9]
and the polar wiretap code [11] as a state-of-the-art reference points. This comparisons show that
our proposed structure for the DNNs in an end-to-end learning setting outperforms the existing
methods in terms of reliability and secrecy.
The paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. An overview
of two of the most effective codes for the wiretap channel is discussed in Section III. Deep
learning techniques required for the end-to-end learning of the codes including MINE is described
in Section IV. We propose end-to-end learning of the codes for the wiretap channel in Section V.
Numerical results are presented in Section VI. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The Gaussian wiretap channel is considered where the channels corresponding to Alice-Bob
and Alice-Eve are assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The former is referred
to as the main channel while the latter is called the wiretapper channel. Denoting an input of
length n by x, the output of an AWGN channel is obtained by y = x+w, where w is a length-n
Gaussian noise vector whose components are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
variance N0/2 and zero mean. Also, x denotes the binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) version
of the transmitted codeword c. When energy per dimension is one, we have Eb = 1/R where
Eb and R denote the energy per bit and transmission rate, respectively. We refer to Eb/N0 as
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the rest of the paper. The designer’s goal in this model is to
come up with codes that satisfy two criteria: reliability and security. The former ensures that
the secret messages m can be decoded with sufficient reliability at Bob, i.e., BERB ≤ κ. The
latter expresses the requirement that Eve should not be able to extract information about the
secret messages. This is captured through I(m;yE) ≤  where yE denotes Eve’s observation.
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4The parameters κ and  are predefined small values that are set by the designer to meet the
system’s requirement. In this work, we aim at learning end-to-end codes in order to satisfy these
requirements. To this end, we assume each party is equipped with DNNs for encoding/decoding.
The objective for Alice-Bob is to learn codes that satisfy the reliability and security constraints
while Eve is trained to decode the secret messages.
III. CODING SCHEMES FOR SECURING THE PHY LAYER
Researchers have relied on tools and ideas from cryptography and coding theory literature
to design secure codes for the wiretap channel. In this section, we introduce two of the most
effective coding schemes, i.e., scrambling and randomized encoding, which reportedly result in
the lowest security gaps [3], [4]. Later on in Section V, we leverage the main ideas behind these
techniques in order to design the DNN at Alice. In the classical coding approach, a data message
u of length k is mapped to a codeword c of length n through c = uG, where G is a k × n
matrix. G is called the generator matrix of a (k, n)-linear block code, and acts as an encoder. In
this way, each message is mapped to a unique codeword.
Scrambling is proposed in [3] for PHY security in which Alice implements encoding as
c = uSG, where G is the k × n generator matrix in systematic form and S is a nonsingular
k × k binary scrambling matrix. Owing to its systematic form, G can be written as G = [I|C],
where I is a k× k identity matrix and C is k× (n− k) representing the parity-check constraints.
Thus, encoding simply consists of replacing the information vector with its scrambled version
u′ = uS, and then applying the linear block code given by G. According to the physical layer
security principle, both S and G are made public and both of them are necessary for decoding.
Decoding process includes descrambling, i.e., multiplication by S−1, which will propagate the
errors [12] at lower SNRs where Eve is assumed to be working while leaving the decoding
performance at higher SNRs (Bob’s intended region) “less affected”.
Randomized encoding scheme, also known as coset coding, is the classical coding method for
confusing Eve. Unlike two previous methods, where each codeword corresponded to a unique
message, the randomized scheme maps each message to a coset of codewords. The randomized
encoding is devised in the following manner. Let m and r denote vectors of message and random
bits of length k and r, respectively. Furthermore, consider two matrices G and H of size k × n
and r × n, respectively. Then, a codeword of length n is generated through c =
[
m r
]H
G
 ,
DRAFT
5assuming the rows of G and H are linearly independent. Denoting the coset corresponding to
the ith message, i.e., mi, by Ci, the randomized encoder picks a codeword from Ci based on r.
For all these schemes, no secret information (e.g., keys) is assumed between Alice and Bob, and
Bob and Eve are both aware of the underlying coding technique employed by Alice.
IV. DEEP LEARNING TOOLS FOR CODE DESIGN
We present an overview of two deep learning tools that are essential for designing secure
codes. The first one is a framework for the computation of mutual information between two
random variables with arbitrary probability distributions. The second one is a technique that
enables training of a neural network with binary constraints imposed on its outputs/weights.
A. Mutual Information Neural Estimation (MINE)
As described in Section II, one needs to compute mutual information in order to measure
the security performance. For continuous channels including AWGN, computation of mutual
information is not tractable in general [8]. However, a recently-proposed algorithm in deep learning
literature, i.e., MINE, enables us to compute this quantity using SGD and Donsker-Varadhan
representation of the Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence defined as
I(x; y) = DKL(p(x, y)||p(x)p(y))
≥ Ep(x,y)[U ]− log(Ep(x)p(y)[eU ]) (1)
where x and y denote two random variables with arbitrary distributions. Furthermore, U is a
function that maps the samples from the joint and marginal distributions to a real number. Given
that U is expressive enough, the above lower bound converges to the true mutual information.
Denoting the parameterized version of U by {Uγ}γ∈Γ, MINE solves the following optimization
problem:
sup
γ∈Γ
Ep(x,y)[Uγ]− log(Ep(x)p(y)[eUγ ]), (2)
where the expectations are estimated using empirical samples from the joint and marginal
distributions. This can be effectively solved via SGD algorithms using mini-batches of two
datasets corresponding to each distribution. In this way, the neural network is trained through
back-propagation which results in the optimal set of parameters θ. If one chooses Uγ from the
class of functions represented by fully-connected feed-forward neural networks, the size of the
DRAFT
6function space Γ is determined by the number of hidden layers and neurons in each network.
If this numbers are chosen properly, Γ is large enough for an accurate estimate of the mutual
information. In practice, it is important to collect enough data from each distribution for training
in order to ensure convergence [10].
B. Neural Networks with Binarized Outputs
As we will show in section V, learning end-to-end secure codes for the wiretap channel
requires utilizing neural networks which output binary values 0, 1 (or equivalently +1, −1).
This can be realized by using a sign function xb =
1 , x ≥ 0,0 , x < 0, as the activation function of
the output layer. However, derivative of the sign function is zero almost everywhere, making it
apparently incompatible with the backpropagation, as the exact gradient of the cost with respect
to the neural network’s weights/biases would be zero. To get around this impediment, the authors
in [13] propose a method called straight-through estimator (STE) which affects the training
process in two phases. Firstly for the forward pass, the binary value xb is evaluated using the
sign function. Secondly for the backpropagation, the gradient of the loss function with respect to
(w.r.t) xb is considered to be the same as that w.r.t x, i.e., the gradient of the sign function is
ignored. This heuristic is shown to work well in various learning settings [13].
V. SECURE CODE DESIGN VIA DEEP LEARNING
In this section, we study how deep learning can be employed for designing codes that satisfy
the reliability and security constraints described in Section II. To this end, we consider two
approaches. The first one is based on the idea of autoencoders and is presented recently in [9].
The second one is our proposed method which is called end-to-end learning. Although both these
approaches employ DNNs for learning secure codes, the approach in [9] uses a different metric
for measuring security and the structure of the employed DNNs are also different. Furthermore,
in order to comply with the finite alphabet signaling for achieving physical layer security [1],
we force the DNNs to learn codes which are being modulated via BPSK scheme (either +1
or −1 are being sent through the channel). As will be discussed later, this is in contrast to the
approach presented in [9] which assumes a continuous modulation is being used at the encoder
and real-valued symbols are being sent through the channel.
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7A. Secure Code Design via Autoencoders
The authors in [9] propose learning codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel utilizing the
autoencoders. These networks can be seen, in general, as two DNNs where the input of the first
network and the output of the second network are identical. An autoencoder matches well to the
classic problem of communication between two parties where its first constituent DNN can be
seen as the encoder and the second one corresponds to the decoder. Denoting the secret message
bits and the Eve’s observation by m and z, respectively, the optimization problem which is being
solved by the autoencoder in [9] is
min
C
wBBER + wEI(m, z), (3)
where the BER corresponds to the reliability between Alice and Bob, while wB and wE are
weights which indicate the relative importance of each term in the objective function. The encoder
network of the autoencoder learns the modulated version of the codes learns based on the above
objective function. This modulation does not correspond to a finite-alphabet scheme as the output
of the encoder consists of the real-valued numbers. The authors in [9] estimate BER for each
mini-batch of data via mean square error. For the computation of mutual information term, two
different approximations are being used by the authors. The first method uses an upper bound of
the leakage based on the upper and lower bounds of differential entropy of Gaussian mixtures,
while the second one approximates the leakage function by invoking the Taylor expansion.
There are issues associate with each of the two methods for computing the mutual information.
Specifically, the upper bound approach is shown to be not very effective during training as it
is loose. Moreover, one needs to compute the entropy of the Gaussian mixtures for the Taylor
expansion scheme which is not trivial in general. Therefore, the authors had to force their
analysis to the low-SNR regimes where the Gaussian mixtures can be approximated by a single
Gaussian and computation of the entropy becomes feasible. We also note that the authors in [9]
do not consider any learning capability (in terms of DNNs) for Eve and assume that learning
performance between Alice and Bob would not be affected by the presence of an Eve which
could also train a DNN to decode the messages simultaneously. This is an important note as
the adversary may have access to excessive computational resources which could deteriorate the
learning performance of the autoencoder in finding secure codes.
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8B. Learning End-to-End Secure Codes
We assume DNNs are being used at each of the communication parties in the wiretap channel,
i.e., Alice, Bob and Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Specifically, DNNs at Alice encode/map a
message m to a codeword c, corresponding noisy versions of which are being decoded by the
DNNs at Bob and Eve. In order to ensure that DNN at Alice sends BPSK symbols through the
channel, we use STE described in Section IV-B in its output layer.
As communicating parties are modeled by DNNs, it is crucial for the learning process to
have a proper loss function based on the design objectives. The main difference of our approach
to the autoencoder approach in [9] relies on the fact that we make use of MINE to directly
compute the mutual information through the gradient decent algorithm. Towards this goal, we
begin with introducing notations. We denote the output of the encoder at Alice by AθA(m) where
m and θA denote the input bits (secret message) and DNNs’ parameters at Alice, respectively.
We note that AθA(m) is a vector of +1’s and −1’s, corresponding to the BPSK version of the
learned codeword by Alice, which is generated utilizing the STE method described in Section
IV-B. Similarly, the outputs of the decoders at Bob and Eve are shown by BθB(yB(θA)) and
EθE(yE(θA)) where yB(θA) and yE(θA) denote the observations at Bob and Eve, respectively.
For Alice-Bob link, we wish to design an encoder at Alice which satisfies the reliability and
security constraints. In particular, the reliability constraint requires the DNN at Bob to be able to
decode/map yB(θA) to the secret message m. Therefore, the reliability loss function is defined
as
LR(θA, θB) = d
(
m, BθB
(
yB(θA)
))
, (4)
where d denotes the L1 distance function which is defined for vectors u and v of length k as
d(u,v) =
∑k
i=1 |ui − vi| assuming ui to be the ith element of u. The security constraint is
measured in terms of the mutual information between the Eve’s observation and the messages.
Therefore,
LS(θA) = Iφ
(
m;yE(θA)
)
, (5)
is defined as the security loss function, where Iφ is computed using MINE described in Section
IV-A via a fully-connected feed-forward DNN parameterized by φ. Furthermore, all the message
bits are expected to be encoded in AθA(m), which leads to Alice’s loss function defined as
LA(θA) = −Iψ
(
m;AθA(m)
)
, (6)
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Fig. 1: End-to-end learning of the encoder and the decoders in the Gaussian wiretap channel.
where Iψ denotes the mutual information estimation using MINE via the same type of DNN as
for Iφ, which is denoted by ψ for this case. The loss function for the Alice-Bob link is composed
of the above three losses as
LAB(θA, θB) = αLR(θA, θB) + βLS(θA) + γLA(θA), (7)
where the parameters α, β and γ reflect the relative gains for each constituent loss. Then, the
optimal DNNs at Alice and Bob, denoted by θ∗A, θ
∗
B, respectively, are obtained by
(θ∗A, θ
∗
B) = argmin
θA,θB
LAB(θA, θB). (8)
Meanwhile, Eve aims at decoding the message bits by choosing the loss function,
LE(θA, θE) = d
(
m, EθE
(
yE(θA)
))
. (9)
Similarly, optimal Eve is obtained by θ∗E = argminθE LE(θA, θE). For the DNNs at Bob and
Eve, denoted by θB and θE , respectively, we use fully-connected feed-forward networks details
of which are presented in Section VI. We have not observed performance improvements upon
utilizing a different DNN structure for these decoders. In contrast, we study three different DNN
structures for Alice. On the other hand, choice of the encoder’s DNNs have been shown to play
a major role on the overall performance of the system as pointed out in the following.
We consider different architectures for the DNN at Alice based on each of the coding methods
described in Section III, and compare their performance in Section VI.
1) Classic encoder: Alice maps the input bits to the output bits via a DNN consisting of
fully-connected layers followed by convolutional layers as depicted in Fig. 2.a. The reshape
operation refers to transforming a vector of size n to an i× j matrix (n = i× j), which allows
output of the fully-connected layers to be further processed by the convolutional layers. The
reverse of such operation is referred to as flattening. We have observed through several numerical
experiments that this concatenation results in the best performance for designing secure PHY
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by F
Fig. 2: Three different DNN architectures for the encoder at Alice (FC: fully-connected).
codes. The reverse order, i.e., putting fully-connected layers after the convolutional ones, is
widely used for the case of image classification.
2) Scrambling encoder: In this case, as illustrated in Fig. 2.b the codewords generated by the
classic encoder are input to another DNN (of the same architecture) which acts as a scrambler,
and generates the final codeword sent over the channel. Although the generator matrix in the
scrambling method, described in Section III, is systematic, we refrain from imposing further
constraints on the DNNs as we have not seen any performance improvements by doing so. In
fact, we let the DNNs find the optimal encoder and the optimal scrambler which would minimize
the loss function.
3) Randomized encoder: This encoder is constructed based on the idea of coset coding where
the random bits (r) are involved in the process of encoding the message bits (m). Fig. 2.c
demonstrates this encoder, where separate DNNs are used for the random and the message bits,
and the weighted sum of the outputs are input to the convolutional layers. Specifically, the encoder
is now denoted by AθA(m, r). We note that the coset coding scheme as described in Section III
involves mod-2 sum of the codewords generated from the random and the message bits, which
enables constructing the coset structure. However, this sum cannot be used for learning codes
in an end-to-end fashion as the mod-2 sum does not allow the gradient flow as required by the
back-propagation algorithm. Hence, we resort to the weighted sum as a workaround, to mix the
DNNs’ outputs. Furthermore, in order to encourage the incorporation of the random bits during
the encoding process, we modify the reliability loss function in (4) as
LR(θA, θB,r, θB,m) =d
(
m, BθB,m
(
yB(θA)
))
+ d
(
r, BθB,r
(
yB(θA)
))
, (10)
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Algorithm 1 End-to-end learning with the randomized encoder
θ ← Initialization values, for θ ∈ {θA, θB,m, θB,r, θE, ψ, φ}
repeat
Generate b samples for the message and the random bits:
{m(i)}bi=1, {r(i)}bi=1
Generate y(i)B and y
(i)
E via c
(i) = AθA(m
(i), r(i)).
{m˜(i)}bi=1 ← Shuffled {m(i)}bi=1 w.r.t i’s
Generate BθB,m(y
(i)
B ), BθB,r(y
(i)
B ), EθE(y
(i)
E )
Compute L(i)AB(θA, θB) via (7), θB = {θB,m, θB,r}
Compute L(i)E (θA, θE) via (9)
V(θA, θB)← 1b
∑b
i=1 L
(i)
AB(θA, θB)
The gradient G(θA, θB)← ∇(θA,θB)V
U(θA, θE)← 1b
∑b
i=1 L
(i)
E (θA, θE), G(θE)← ∇θE U
Update the networks’ parameters:
θ ← θ − G(θ) for θ ∈ {θA, θB, θE}
ξ(ψ)← 1
b
∑b
i=1 Tψ(c
(i),m(i))- log(1
b
∑b
i=1 e
Tψ(c
(i),m˜(i)))
ϑ(φ)← 1
b
∑b
i=1 Tφ(y
(i)
E ,m
(i))- log(1
b
∑b
i=1 e
Tφ(y
(i)
E ,m˜
(i)))
MINE gradients: G(ψ)← ∇ψ ξ(ψ), G(φ)← ∇φ ϑ(φ)
θ ← θ + G(θ) for θ ∈ {ψ, φ}
until Convergence
where BθB,m and BθB,r denote the decoders corresponding to the message and random bits,
parameterized by θB,m and θB,r, respectively. So, Bob is trained to decode both the message
and random bits from the observation yB. The following algorithm presents the details of the
learning process for this encoder.
C. Adaptive Gradient Clipping
According to the loss function in (7), the encoder’s parameters, θA, are updated by three
gradients, two of which correspond to the use of MINE. We have seen through our experiments
that these gradients can overwhelm the other one. This indeed can lead to a point where the
encoder puts all its attention on the mutual information losses [10], and ignore the reliability
loss. To circumvent this impediment, we adaptively clip the MINE-originated gradients, GM ,
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during the learning process so that their L2-norm is at most equal to that of the gradient of the
reliability loss, GR. Mathematically, for the adapted GM , denoted by Ga, we have
Ga = min(||GR||2, ||GM ||2) GM||GM ||2 . (11)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results on the performance of the codes learned in an
end-to-end manner utilizing deep learning. We begin by presenting the specifications of the
DNNs described in Section V which are observed to be efficient in terms of complexity and
performance based on several experiments. The DNNs for MINE which were denoted by ψ and
φ, consist of 4 fully-connected hidden layers each having 400 neurons and rectified linear unit
(ReLU) as the activation function. For the Encoder 1 structure in Fig. 2, we use 3 hidden layers
with 500 neurons and ReLU activation function, followed by another layer with 256 neurons and
tanh function. Furthermore, we use two 1D convolutional layers with ReLU activation function
whose kernel size (length of the convolution window) is 4 with a stride of 1. The number of
output filters for the first and the second one is set to 16 and 32, respectively. Dimension of
the very last fully-connected layer after the convolutional layers is the same as the code length
(n) for which the STE is used to binarized the outputs. For the randomized encoder in Fig. 2.c,
there are two fully-connected networks and one convolution network whose specifications are
set to be the same as the corresponding ones in Encoder 1. The factor F is set to 20 for this
encoder. Finally, the DNNs for the decoders, denoted by θB and θE , are both chosen to have 5
hidden layers each having 500 neurons and ReLU as the activation function. For their output
layer, the sigmoid function is used where the values greater than 0.5 are decoded as 1, and those
less than 0.5 are mapped to 0. We have not seen any performance improvement for Eve (in
terms of decoding) by choosing a more complicated network as θE . For training, we initialize
the DNN parameters with random values following a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
variance 0.1. We further use a minibatch of size b = 2048 along with Adam optimizer with a
learning rate of 0.0004 to minimize the loss function. We note that the training alternates between
Alice-Bob and Eve, each being trained on one minibatch, as described in detail in Algorithm
1 for the randomized encoder. A Tensorflow implementation of Algorithm 1 is presented as a
Github repository in [14].
We have examined the performance of the three encoders presented in Section V-B along
with the effect of different code parameters, i.e., n, k and r. Upon increasing the dimension of
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the involved random variables, MINE requires a larger sample space and a more complicated
network to converge to the right value which could be prohibitively complex. Due to this fact,
we mainly focus on small length codes and evaluate their performances from the perspective
of security and reliability constraints. This is demonstrated in Figs. 3 and 4 for BER at bob
(reliability) and I(m;yE) (security), respectively, when Eve’s SNR is set to −2 dB. We note
that training is done for Alice-Bob and Eve at a specific SNR at Bob which is represented in the
x-axis. Furthermore, the weights in the loss (7), i.e., α, β and γ, are chosen in a way to ensure
that all the k secret bits are used for encoding, i.e., I(m, AθA(m)) = k.
A code designer considers Figs. 3 and 4 simultaneously, and wishes to select the codes which
satisfy the predefined requirements on the reliability and security constraints. Specifically, for
k = 5, n = 16 and Eb/N0 = 10 dB, the classic encoder (CE), described in Section V-B1, has been
capable of learning codes which result in an approximate BER of 0.008. However, it performs
poorly from the security perspective as I(m;yE) is around 0.7, and Eve’s BER is 0.26. At the
expense of sacrificing the reliability, the scrambler encoder (SE) introduced in Section V-B2
has shown to improve the security loss by a small margin for the same design parameters. The
poor performance of the CE and SE in providing secure communication stems from their DNNs’
architecture which prevents them from learning secure codes. This point is further highlighted
by looking at the performance of the randomized encoder (RE) proposed in Section V-B3. One
can see that for k = 5, r = 11, n = 16 and Eb/N0 = 10 dB, I(m;yE) of about 0.02 is achieved
which exhibits a great improvement in comparison to the other two encoders. For this case, we
have also observed that BER at Eve is above 0.49 which indicates that she has not been able to
learn a decoder for the messages. Of course, the gain in security is achieved by compromising
the reliability constraint to some extent which might be tolerated based on the design goals.
Figs. 3 and 4 also include the performance results from the autoencoder approach, presented
in [9], as the most similar learning approach for physical layer code design to our work and the
polar wiretap coding (WTC) [11] as a state-of-the-art reference point. For these schemes, Eve is
assumed to work at SNR = −5 dB while Bob’s SNR is 0 dB. As noted in [9], the authors are
limiting their analysis to the low SNR regime as this assumption enables them to approximate
the mutual information term. It is shown that for similar code lengths and code rates, the codes
learned through the end-to-end manner via the randomized encoder proposed in Section V-B3
outperform both the codes corresponding to the autoencoder and the polar WTC schemes from
the security and reliability perspectives.
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Fig. 3: BER performance of the end-to-end learned codes at Bob for the case where α = γ = 1. CE, SE and RE
denote classical, scrambling and randomized encoder, respectively.
Another important observation from the results can be made in relation to the r, i.e., the number
of random bits. Specifically, for the RE with k = 5, n = 24, it is shown that as r gets larger,
the system gets more secured. Notably, I(m;yE) less than 0.01 is achieved via k = 5, r = 13,
n = 24 while BER at Bob is less than 0.03. To get a better sense of the security performance of
the learned codes, we consider the equivocation region which is defined as H(m|yE)/k versus
the transmission rate k/n. For the rate of 5/24, and when the SNRs at Eve and Bob are set to
−2 and 10 dB, respectively, the boundary of this region is the maximum value, i.e., 1. One can
confirm that the points achieved by the randomized encoders with parameters r = 11 and r = 13
are 0.995 and 0.997, respectively, which are very close to the boundary. Finally, we note that
a designer can tweak the weights α, β and γ, in order to learn codes which are suited for the
desired levels of reliability and security. For instance, it is shown that increasing β leads to a
lower I(m;yE) and a higher BER at Bob.
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Fig. 4: Mutual information between the Eve’s observation and the messages for the end-to-end learned codes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed end-to-end learning of the codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel where
each party is equipped with DNNs. Alice and Bob are trained in a manner to provide reliability
for Bob while ensuring security against Eve. Simultaneously, Eve trains her network in order
to decode the secret messages. The security is measured in terms of the mutual information
between the messages and the Eve’s observation using MINE. The numerical results show
that a secure system can be designed in this setting with finite-length codes. In particular, by
utilizing a randomized encoder, Alice can achieve points as close as 0.003 to the boundary of
the equivocation region for a transmission rate of 5/24. The presented results are compared
with the existing deep learning approach based on the idea of autoencoders which highlights
the superiority of our proposed method in achieving reliable and secure codes for the wiretap
channel.
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